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Abstract
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is
proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite popula-
tions of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical
results from game theory, evolutionary game theory and graph theory
are used. More specifically, each player is placed in a vertex of the
graph and he is seen as an infinite population of replicators which
replicate within the vertex. At each time instant, a game is played by
two replicators belonging to different connected vertices, and the out-
come of the game influences their ability of producing offspring. Then,
the behavior of a vertex player is determined by the distribution of
strategies used by the internal replicators. Under suitable hypotheses,
the proposed model is equivalent to the classical replicator equation.
Extended simulations are performed to show the dynamical behavior
of the solutions and the potentialities of the developed model.
Keywords: replicator equation on graph, evolutionary game theory,
finite populations, complex networks.
1 Introduction
In mathematical literature, there are important examples of models designed
to describe the dynamical interaction between a set of players in a game-like
context [1–4]. Players are undistinguishable members of a large popula-
tion, characterized by a phenotype which determines the fixed strategy they
choose among the M available, when playing with any other individual ran-
domly selected in the population.
The payoff earned in the game by each player depends on the elements
of a game-specific payoff matrix, while the system dynamics is described
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by an ordinary differential equation defined in the N-simplex, namely the
replicator equation [5, 6].
The solutions of the replicator equation may evolve towards evolutionary
stable strategies, which are Nash equilibria of the game and asymptotically
stable stationary states [7]. Evolutionary stable strategies are robust against
invasion by competing strategies [6, 8]. Other kind of Nash equilibria can
also exist, such as equilibria corresponding to Lyapunov stable stationary
states of the replicator equation [9].
Replicator equation has been used to describe several phenomena, such
as biological evolution driven by replication and selection [10], and reaction-
diffusion dynamics [11, 12]. Replicator dynamics including mutation have
been studied in [2] and may lead to more complex behaviors, character-
ized by Hopf bifurcation and limit cycles [13, 14]. Moreover, the replicator
equation has been used for solving decision and consensus control prob-
lems [15, 16] and machine learning for optimization [17]. Significant appli-
cation have been also developed in the field of social science [18]. Although
widespread, the replicator equation is grounded on several strong assump-
tions on the system under investigation.
1. The population is very large. Indeed, dominating strategies emerge
due to higher rates of replication than the others, causing the frequency
of less efficient strategies to become irrelevant in the total population.
2. Any member of the population can play with any other member with
the same probability. Participants of each game are chosen randomly
and no social structures are present in the population.
3. The payoff earned by each player is defined by the payoff matrix,
which is unique for all the population. In some cases, two or more
subpopulations with different payoff matrices are considered [19].
4. Players are constrained to behave according to a single fixed strategy
at each round of the game they are playing. For instance, if the phe-
notype of an individual is to be aggressive or generous, he will show
the same level of aggressiveness or generosity in any situation at any
time, without having the capacity of regulating the level of his natural
impulses.
The above assumptions are the basis of the well known equivalence
between the replicator equation and some ecological models, such as the
predator-prey model introduced by Lotka and Volterra [5].
Several modifications have been introduced in the replicator equation to
overcome the limitations caused by the above assumptions. For example,
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in [18] is presented a generalization of the replicator equation to N players.
Concerning networked populations, many efforts have been done to include
the topology of connections between players in [2, 20–23] to deal with sce-
narios in which the connection between agents plays a fundamental role
and may yield to the interpretation of inspected phenomena. For example,
in [21] is proposed an algorithm that uses the connections among players
and specific updating rules to induce cooperative behavior in an evolution-
ary prisoner dilemma game. On the other hand, a seminal paper by Ohtsuki
et al. [24] presented the replicator equation on infinite graphs, under the as-
sumption that every vertex is connected to the same number of neighbours.
In particular, he showed that the replicator equation on a graph with fixed
degree is equivalent to a classical replicator equation when the degree goes
to infinity.
In this paper, we derive a suitable mathematical model to describe static
and dynamical behaviour of an N -players game interaction, where an agent
is meant to engage his challenges only with a restricted set of players con-
nected to him. To this aim, we make use of the standard non-cooperative
game theory results and graph theory. The results presented in the paper
generalize many assumptions under the classical replicator equation and re-
cent results on the replicator equation on graphs. Specifically, the equation
derived in this paper meets the following:
1. A finite (even small) or infinite population is considered.
2. The elements of the population are the vertices of a graph. Each
element can be engaged in a game with another element only if they
are connected in the graph. No constraints on the topology of the
graph are assumed. Moreover, the connections can be weighted to
remark different perceived importance of each interaction.
3. The payoff matrix can be player-specific, including the situations where
the perception of the game is different for each individual.
4. Each player can behave according to a combination of strategies. He
is a sort of ”mixed player”, thus incorporating composite and multi-
ple personality traits. His behavior can be driven contemporarily by
heterogeneous impulses with different strengths, such as, for exam-
ple, being cooperative and non cooperative, generous and selfish, at
the same time. The proposed approach makes players more realistic
than in the classical framework and naturally extends the evolutionary
game theory to a social context with human players.
The new framework presented in the paper generalizes the classical repli-
cator equation, that can be obtained as a special case by assuming that any
individual of the population possesses the same payoff matrix and starts
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playing from an identical initial condition.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminar-
ies on noncooperative games on graphs. Then, the extended version of the
replicator equation on graphs with generic topology is introduced in Section
3. Some properties of the new replicator equation are presented in Section
3.2, including the equivalence to the classical replicator equation when ho-
mogeneous initial conditions are used. Extended simulations are reported in
Section 5, while some conclusions and future work are discussed in Section
6.
2 Non-cooperative games on graphs
In real world situations, interactions between a finite number of rational
players can be influenced by topological constraints; in most cases, each
player is only able to meet with a reduced number of opponents which are
close with respect to a suitable topology, such as the distance between them.
In this sense, we talk about networks of players, where interconnections de-
pend on the context. An interesting case of interaction is represented by
non-cooperative games, extensively studied in [3, 7].
In this section, we extend the classical game theory by introducing a
network, represented by a graph, which describes the connection among the
involved players.
2.1 Preliminaries about games on graphs
Typically, networks are described by means of graphs, and in a game con-
text, each player is represented by a vertex. An edge between two players
indicates that they interact. However, a player can consider that some inter-
actions are more important than others. Moreover, two connected players
can have different perception of the importance of their interaction. These
aspects can be accounted by assuming that the graph is weighted and di-
rected; an edge starting from a player and ending to another, is labeled with
a positive weight to indicate the importance that the first player attributes
to the game.
Formally, let G be a directed weighted graph of order N < +∞, and let
V be the set of vertices (players) (V = {1, . . . , N}). The graph G is fully
described by its adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N+ ; in particular, when player v
is meant to play with player w, then there is an edge which starts from v
and ends to w. In this case, (v, w)-entry of A, av,w, is the positive weight
attributed by v to the game against w. When av,w > 0 and aw,v = 0, there
is an interaction between v and w, but only v will get a payoff after the
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challenge. Finally, if both av,w and aw,v are equal to 0, then there is no
interaction between these players. In general, av,w 6= aw,v. We assume that
G has no self-edge, which means that no player has interaction with himself
(i.e. av,v = 0 ∀v ∈ V). We indicate with Nv = {w ∈ V : av,w > 0∨aw,v > 0}
the neighborhood of v (i.e. the set of vertices that interact with v), and with
N+v = {w ∈ V : av,w > 0} the out-neighborhood of v (i.e. the set of vertices
v is connected to with and exiting edge). The cardinalities of these set are
indicated with δv and δ
+
v , and they represent the degree and out-degree of
v respectively. Note that, in general, N+v ⊆ Nv, and also δ+v ≤ δv.
A player v will play exactly δv two-players games with all its neighbours.
In each one-to-one competition, the set of available strategies for both play-
ers is S = {1, . . . ,M}, while the outcome that player v can obtain is defined
by a payoff matrix Bv ∈ RM×M ; when player v uses strategy s ∈ S in a
two-players game against a player which uses strategy r ∈ S, then he earns
a payoff equal to the (s, r)-entry of Bv, bv,s,r = e
T
sBver, where es and er
are the s-th and r-th versors of RM , respectively.
Each player decides to use the same strategy s ∈ S in all the games he
is involved in. He will play against all vertices in Nv, but he will earn a
payoff only when he plays with a player w ∈ N+v , since when av,w = 0 and
aw,v > 0, there is an interaction which is meaningful only for player w.
2.2 Effective payoff for games on graphs
In an interconnected context, the effective payoff earned (or the fitness of a
strategy) must be defined as an environmental measure depending on all the
interactions between near players. This measure must quantify how well a
strategy behaves. Since each connection between two players has a positive
weight, we pose that the effective payoff for a generic player v is the weighted
average of all obtained payoffs. Let’s denote with sw ∈ S the strategy of
the generic player w. Then, the effective payoff of player v, piv(s1, . . . , sN )
is the following:
piv(s1, . . . , sN ) =
1
dv
∑
w∈N+v
eTsvBvesw =
= eTsvBv
(
1
dv
N∑
w=1
av,wesw
)
, (1)
where dv =
∑N
w=1 av,w is the normalization factor. This model of payoff
based on weighted average will be denoted with WA. However, there are
situations in which payoffs are cumulative and the weighted sum is used
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without the normalization factor dv. In this case we have that:
piv(s1, . . . , sN ) =
∑
w∈N+v
eTsvBvesw =
= eTsv(dvBv)
(
1
dv
N∑
w=1
av,wesw
)
. (2)
The payoff model based on weighted sum (WS) can be considered as WA,
where each payoff matrix is substituted by dvBv. For this reason, we will
mainly work on WA model, unless differently specified.
The term 1dv
∑N
w=1 av,wesw that appears in both WA and WS models, is
a vector where all components are non-negative numbers which sum up to 1.
In a certain way, player v fights against one virtual player which summarize
all the strategies used by its opponents in the set N+v ; in general, the strat-
egy used by the virtual player is a mixed strategy which represents what
player v effectively sees around him. This aspect will be deeply investigated
later in this paper, because it plays a fundamental role to reach our aim.
2.3 (N −M)-games and games on graphs
Notice that, for each v, piv can be interpreted as a N -dimensional tensor,
where the (s1, . . . , sN )-entry is piv(s1, . . . , sN ). In this way, the game in-
teraction between interconnected players on a finite graph is equivalent to
a N -players game, where the set of pure strategies is S, and the payoff of
player v is represented by the tensor piv. The structure of the graph is em-
bedded in this definition, since the payoff tensor depends on the adjacency
matrix A. Moreover, there are no assumptions made on the structure of the
graph itself.
For example, consider the following matrices:
A =
 0 1 µµ 0 2µ
0 µ 0
 , B = [ a b
c d
]
, (3)
where µ ≥ 0, and assume that Bv = B for all v. In this case, V = {1, 2, 3}
and S = {1, 2}. Table 1 shows the payoff tensors piv of each player, which
depend on the model parameters µ, a, b, c and d. Both models WA and WS
are considered.
It is evident that the presence of weights, the asymmetry of the ma-
trix, and the use of a particular payoff model may lead to very different
6
pi1(s1, s2, s3) pi2(s1, s2, s3) pi3(s1, s2, s3)
s1 s2 s3 WA WS WA WS WA WS
1 1 1 a a(1 + µ) a 3aµ a aµ
1 1 2 a+bµ1+µ a+ bµ
a+2b
3 (a+ 2b)µ c cµ
1 2 1 aµ+b1+µ aµ+ b c 3cµ b bµ
1 2 2 b b(1 + µ) c+2d3 (c+ 2d)µ d dµ
2 1 1 c c(1 + µ) 2a+b3 (2a+ b)µ a aµ
2 1 2 c+dµ1+µ c+ dµ b 3bµ c cµ
2 2 1 cµ+d1+µ cµ+ d
2c+d
3 (2c+ d)µ b bµ
2 2 2 d d(1 + µ) d 3dµ d dµ
Table 1: Payoff tensor of the game on graphs defined by matrices in equation
(3) for WA and WS payoff models. For each combination of strategies
(s1, s2, s3) the payoffs pi1, pi2 and pi3 of players 1, 2, 3 are reported.
calculation of the payoff tensor, and hence, the structure of the game itself
changes. Indeed, the effective payoff obtained by a player when he is en-
gaged in a game is essentially evaluated by means of tensors, depending on
the adjacency matrix of the graph. These payoffs define the virtual player
mentioned at the end of Section 2.2, which embodies all the strategies used
by the player’s opponents. As a consequence, each player in the game is a
sort of ”mixed player”, thus incorporating composite and multiple personal-
ity traits, and behaving according to heterogeneous impulses with different
strengths.
As a natural consequence, a N -players M -strategies game (from now on,
(N,M)-game) can be extended over the set of mixed strategies ∆M :
∆M = {z = [z1 . . . zM ]T ∈ RM :
M∑
i=1
zi = 1 ∧ zi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S}.
We indicate with xv = [xv,1 . . . xv,M ]
T ∈ ∆M the mixed strategy of player
v. Recall that xv,s is the probability that player v uses strategy s, while he
takes part in the games. The formula of the expected effective payoff that
player v obtains, is similar to equation (1):
piv(x1, . . . ,xN ) =
1
dv
∑
w∈N+v
xTvBvxw =
= xTvBv
(
1
dv
N∑
w=1
av,wxw
)
, (4)
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where xTvBvxw represents the expected outcome for player v of the one-
to-one game played by v itself against w. From now on, we pose that
piv(xv,x−v) = piv(x1, . . . ,xN ), where x−v indicates the group of all the
vectors xw, with w 6= v.
When a pure strategy s is used by player v, vector xv takes the form of
the standard versor es of RM . If each xw is a versor, say xw = esw , then
equations (1) and (4) coincide. Furthermore, we can define the expected
payoff pv,s of player v when he is preprogrammed to use the strategy s
(hence xv = es) in all games played against its neighbours:
pv,s = piv(es,x−v) =
= eTsBv
(
1
dv
N∑
w=1
avwxw
)
. (5)
Equation (5) easily leads to a more convenient definition of the expected
payoff obtained by the player v. That is:
φv = piv(xv,x−v) =
= xTvBv
(
1
dv
N∑
w=1
avwxw
)
. (6)
The present work uses the same theoretical issues developed in the clas-
sical non-cooperative (N −M)-games theory ( [3, 7, 25]). The differences
here introduced, consist with the possibility of embedding any topological
structure in the game; indeed, the payoff tensor used to describe the game
depends on the adjacency matrix of the graph.
3 The replicator equation on graphs
Thanks to game theory, we are able to predict the strategies of opponents,
assuming that all of them behave in a rational way during their decision-
making tasks. In fact, rational players choose pure strategies which may lead
to a pure Nash equilibrium, whenever it exists. Recall that Nash theorem [7]
asserts that a game has always at least one Nash equilibrium within the set
of mixed strategies. If the game is repeated over time, we can imagine that
a mixed strategy describes, for each time, the probability that a player uses
a certain pure strategy independently from the choices made until that mo-
ment. Payoff is computed as the average outcome that a player obtains when
the game is reiterated for an infinite number of times, and Nash equilibria
are evaluated accordingly. Although players’ behavior is randomized over
time, there is a precise rational scheme that they follow. Hence, pure and
mixed strategies games are quite similar, since in both cases players decide
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their behaviors through a rational decision-making task at the beginning of
the game.
Often, in real world situations, players do not have a full knowledge
about the game, and the decision-making process suggested by game theory
is not applicable. However, players can learn from the context; time after
time, they are able to compare their payoffs with the outcomes of their op-
ponents, and strategies are changed accordingly. For example, after some
game iterations, one can understand that its opponent is preprogrammed to
play always the same strategy r, and then he decides to adopt the strategy s
which is the best reply to r (i.e. he obtains the maximum payoff knowing the
strategy of his opponent). Also, a player can simply imitate the strongest
opponent to reach a greater payoff.
Evolutionary biology gives an interesting interpretation for mixed strate-
gies. Let’s consider a large population in which each individual is pro-
grammed to play a particular pure strategy. Population is divided according
to a mixed strategy, which indicates the frequency of pure strategies in the
population. Pairs of individuals are randomly drawn from the population
to play games. The average payoff obtained by all players playing a certain
strategy is a measurement of the fitness of that strategy.
Nature promotes fittest strategies; time after time, when a strategy has
a payoff greater than average, its frequency must increase, and consequently,
frequencies relative to poorly fit strategies decrease. This natural selection
process may yield to interesting dynamical phenomena, since the fitness of
each strategy changes over time according to the frequencies of the subpop-
ulations. Natural selection is realized through reproduction. Generally, this
happens asexually and the offspring produced is identical to parent. For
these reasons, a player in this context is also known as replicator. He is
preprogrammed to use a certain strategy and there is no rational decision-
making process. A strategy is something included in the genes of a replicator,
and hence, exhibited from birth. A replicator uses a “good” strategy when
has a fitness greater than the average. Nature favors players with a good
strategy, by allowing them to survive and to produce offspring.
The dynamics of replicator populations can be used to describe several
non-biological situations: scientific ideas, life-styles, political orientations
diffuse by means of imitation and education process that easily replace the
concept of asexual reproduction. In fact, this becomes clearer if we interpret
fitness as a measurement quantifying how well a strategy behaves in a certain
context, whatever it is.
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3.1 Towards evolutionary (N −M)-games
In this section we develop a key idea which leads to the definition of a repli-
cator equation based on a generic graph, where the number of players and
the network structure are arbitrary.
Main idea - We imagine that each vertex of the network contains an
infinite population of individuals. We will refer to such elements as atomic
players, and to vertices of the network as vertex players. The first are
replicators, while the latter are the players introduced in paragraph 2.3 for
(N −M)-games. Basically, each atomic player behaves like the correspond-
ing vertex player: an atomic player of v takes part to 2-players games,
described by payoff matrix Bv, against exactly one atomic player randomly
drawn from each connected vertex, and his effective payoff is the average of
the payoffs obtained in all the one-to-one competitions. By the way, atomic
players are different from vertex players. Indeed, all atomic players inside
a vertex are indistinguishable, except for the fact that each of them is pre-
programmed to use a certain pure strategy in S during all the games he is
involved in. On the contrary, vertex players can also adopt mixed strategies.
Atomic players reproduce themselves by replication, after their participation
to games, inside their population. Furthermore, their capacity to produce
offspring is related to the effective payoff obtained.
Assume that one atomic player is randomly draw from each populations,
and let sw be the strategy used by the one extracted from population w.
Then, the effective payoff earned by the atomic player of population v is
defined by equation (1). Now, xv,s can be interpreted as the share of atomic
players preprogrammed to use the pure strategy s inside the vertex v. This
implies that pv,s is the expected effective payoff obtained by an atomic player
of v when he uses strategy s, while φv represents the expected effective payoff
for a generic atomic player randomly drawn from population v (see equations
(5) and (6)). A mixed strategy of a vertex player can be interpreted as
the way in which its internal population of atomic players is distributed,
according to the pure strategy they are preprogrammed to play.
3.2 Mathematical formulation of the replicator equation on
graphs
Suppose now that the games are iterated in time. We will refer to game
session as the whole set of 2-players games performed on the graph. The
probability for a replicator to survive and to reproduce himself between two
games sessions, depends on the comparison between the effective payoff ob-
tained and the average effective payoff of all other players. Let’s assume
that games’ sessions take place at discrete and equidistant times (say, a
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session after each τ seconds). Let xv,s(t) indicate the share of population
inside vertex v, which is preprogrammed to use the pure strategy s, at time t.
What happens to xv,s(t + τ)? First of all, suppose for a while that the
population size in the generic node v at time t is nv(t). According to [1,2,6],
we can consider that pv,s(t) represents a reproductive rate and therefore,
pv,s(t)τ is the number of offspring produced by one atomic player in v that
uses strategy s between t and t+ τ . Hence, the population size after a time
τ is equal to the previous size plus the produced offspring, since each atomic
player reproduces himself within his population. That is:
nv(t+ τ) = nv(t) +
M∑
r=1
nv(t)xv,r(t)pv,r(t)τ,
where nv(t)xv,r(t) is the size of the subpopulation which uses strategy r at
time t, and nv(t)xv,r(t)pv,r(t)τ is the number of offspring produced by this
subpopulation. By definition, xv,s(t + τ) is the ratio between the size of
subpopulation s and the total population. Therefore:
xv,s(t+ τ) =
nv(t)xv,s(t) + nv(t)xv,s(t)pv,s(t)τ
nv(t+ τ)
=
=
nv(t)xv,s(t)(1 + pv,s(t)τ)
nv(t)
(
1 +
M∑
r=1
xv,r(t)pv,r(t)τ
) =
=
xv,s(t)(1 + pv,s(t)τ)
1 + φv(t)τ
. (7)
Notice that equation (7) does not depend on nv(t), and hence this relation-
ship is valid for any starting size of the population.
Our aim is to develop a mathematical model that describes the evolu-
tionary process on a graph when the time between replication events goes
to 0, thus making atomic players able to reproduce themselves continuously
in time. Let’s consider the difference ratio of xv,s(t):
xv,s(t+ τ)− xv,s(t)
τ
=
xv,s(t)(pv,s(t)− φv(t))
1 + φv(t)τ
.
Letting τ → 0, we obtain that:
x˙v,s(t) = xv,s(t)(pv,s(t)− φv(t)), (8)
where the “dot” indicates the derivative with respect to time t. Finally, we
can write the following Cauchy problem:
x˙v,s(t) = xv,s(t)(pv,s(t)− φv(t))
xv,s(0) = cv,s
∀v ∈ V, ∀s ∈ S, (9)
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where, for consistency, it is assumed that the distribution of strategies at
the initial time t = 0 is known for each vertex (i.e. xv(0) = [cv,1 . . . cv,M ]
T ∈
∆M ).
Systems (9) represents the replicator equation on a graph. Note that no
assumptions on the structure of the graph is needed to derive the equation
(8). Indeed, the adjacency matrix of the network is fully embedded in the
payoff tensors.
It is straightforward to note that the equation (8) has a structure similar
to the classical replicator equation; for example, dominant strategies are the
fittest, and hence when the relative fitness pv,s is better than the average φv,
the corresponding frequencies will grow over time. In the next section, the
very strong correlation between the two equations will be rigorously shown.
Furthermore, the relationship between Nash equilibria of the underlying
(N −M)-game and the rest points of the dynamical equation (8) will also
be discussed in section 4.
4 Properties of the replicator equation on graphs
4.1 Invariance of ∆M
Let xv(t) be the unique solution of problem (9), obtained by posing xv(0) ∈
∆M . In addition, suppose that there exists a time instant t2 where xv,s(t2) <
0. Since all the components of the solution are continuous and non-negative
at t = 0, then there must be a time t1 < t2 such that xv,s(t1) = 0. Following
equation (8), we can state that x˙v,s(t1) = 0, and hence, this component will
be 0 for all times after t1. For the unicity of the solution, this implies that
no time t2 for which xv,s(t2) < 0 exists. Thus, for each v ∈ V we have that:
xv(0) ∈ ∆M ⇒ xv,s(t) ≥ 0, (10)
for all strategies s ∈ S and for all times t > 0. Notice that the total
variation of the strategies distribution in a vertex is null at time t when∑M
s=1 xv,s(t) = 1. In fact:
M∑
s=1
x˙v,s(t) =
M∑
s=1
xv,s(t)(pv,s(t)− φv(t)) =
=
M∑
s=1
xv,s(t)pv,s(t)− φv(t)
M∑
s=1
xv,s(t) =
= φv(t)− φv(t) · 1 = 0.
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This means that:
M∑
s=1
xv,s(t) =
M∑
s=1
xv,s(0) ∀t > 0, ∀v ∈ V. (11)
Imposing that xv(0) ∈ ∆M , the last equation asserts that
∑M
s=1 xv,s(t) =
1 for all time t > 0. Joining the results provided by (10) and (11), we
conclude the following:
∀v ∈ V : xv(0) ∈ ∆M ⇒ xv(t) ∈ ∆M ∀t > 0. (12)
In other words, all trajectories that start inside ∆M remain inside ∆M itself
for all time t > 0. At any time, xv(t) can be always interpreted as a
distribution of strategies.
4.2 Nash equilibria are rest points of the replicator equation
on graph
Recall that the best response function for the static (N −M)-game is:
βv(x−v) =
= {xv ∈ ∆M : piv(xv,x−v) ≥ piv(z,x−v) ∀z ∈ ∆M} .
Suppose that x∗1(t), . . .x∗N (t) is a Nash equilibrium. Then:
x∗v(t) ∈ βv(x∗−v(t))
for each vertex v. This means that:
x˙∗v,s(t) = x
∗
v,s(t)(p
∗
v,s(t)− φ∗v(t)) =
= x∗v,s(t)(piv(es,x
∗
−v(t))− piv(x∗v(t),x∗−v(t))) ≤ 0
Moreover, from (12) we know that:
M∑
s=1
x˙∗v,s(t) = 0 ∀v ∈ V,
and then:
x˙∗v,s = 0 ∀v ∈ V, ∀s ∈ S.
We can conclude that every Nash equilibrium is also a rest point of the
replicator equation on graph.
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4.3 Pure strategies are rest points of the replicator equation
on graph
Suppose that xv(t) = eq. Then pv,q(t) = φv(t) and
x˙v,q(t) = xv,q(t)(pv,q(t)− φv(t)) = 1 · 0 = 0.
In addition, xv,r(t) = 0 if r 6= q, and again:
x˙v,r(t) = xv,r(t)(pv,r(t)− φv(t)) = 0 · (pv,r(t)− φv(t)) = 0.
For this reason:
xv(t) = eq ⇒ x˙v,s(t) = 0 ∀s, q ∈ S.
This implies that if each xv(t) represents a pure strategy (i.e. it is equal
to a versor of RM ), then we have a rest point of the replicator equation on
graph.
4.4 The classical replicator equation as a special case
Suppose to fix a time lag τ > 0, and assume that the mixed strategies are
all the same for each vertex and for any time t0 ∈ [0, τ). That is:
xv(t0) = c = [c1 . . . cM ]
T ∈ ∆M ∀v ∈ V, ∀t0 ∈ [0, τ).
Consider the payoff model WA and suppose that Bv = B for all vertices
v. Following equations (5) and (6), we obtain that pv,s(t0) = e
T
sBc and
φv(t0) = c
TBc. In this case, we can rewrite the difference equation (7) as
follows:
xv,s(t0 + τ) =
cs(1 + τe
T
sBc)
1 + τcTBc
.
Since previous equations do not depend on v, we are able to impose that
y(t0) = xv(t0) and y(t0 + τ) = xv(t0 + τ), ∀v ∈ V, ∀t0 ∈ [0, τ), and hence:
ys(t0 + τ) =
ys(t0)(1 + τe
T
sBy(t0))
1 + τy(t0)TBy(t0)
.
It’s straightforward to note that any other iteration of the previous map
leads to quantities that are independent from v. For example, applying a
second iteration we get that:
xv,s(t0 + 2τ) =
ys(t0 + τ)(1 + τe
T
sBy(t0 + τ))
1 + τy(t0 + τ)TBy(t0 + τ)
,
and hence we can pose that xv(t0 + 2τ) = y(t0 + 2τ). Generalizing to any
time lag, xv(t0 + kτ) = y(t0 + kτ) for any non negative integer k. Similarly,
pv,s(t0 + kτ) = e
T
sBy(t0 + kτ) and φv(t0 + kτ) = y(t0 + kτ)
TBy(t0 + kτ)
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are also independent from v. For these reasons, we pose that ps(t0 + kτ) =
pv,s(t0 + kτ) and φ(t0 + kτ) = φv(t0 + kτ). Then, the discrete map becomes
the following:
ys(t0 + (k + 1)τ) =
ys(t0 + kτ)(1 + τps(t0 + kτ))
1 + τφ(t0 + kτ)
. (13)
Note that, for any t ≥ 0 there exist a non-negative integer k and a real
number t0 ∈ [0, τ), with τ > 0 fixed, such that t = t0 + kτ . Then, equation
(13) becomes:
ys(t+ τ) =
ys(t)(1 + τps(t))
1 + τφ(t)
∀t ≥ 0. (14)
Considering the difference ratio 1τ (ys(t+ τ)− ys(t)), and letting τ → 0, we
obtain the following differential equation:
y˙s(t) = ys(t)(ps(t)− φ(t)), (15)
which is the classical replicator equation.
This result is quite straightforward if we imagine to divide a wide pop-
ulation of replicators into N subpopulations, assuming that all of them are
described by the same mixed strategy of the total one at initial time. Then,
each subpopulation will behave exactly as the total one. Hence, the dynam-
ics of a single subpopulation in a vertex can be described by the classical
replicator equation applied to the single population, whatever is the graph
used.
5 Simulations
In this chapter, we present some simulations produced by equation (8). The
WA payoff model is used. In particular, we set up experimental sessions
by considering different 2-strategies payoff matrices (S = {1, 2}); it is as-
sumed that every vertex has the same payoff matrix. Each session has been
developed over 3 different graphs with 6 vertices as reported in Figure 1.
All edges represented in Figure 1 have the same weight, except for thicker
ones in the asymmetric weighted graph. Note that we are using only undi-
rected graphs (i.e. av,w = aw,v). Our aim is to show the behavior of the
replicator equation on graphs when initial players strategies are almost pure.
In fact, a vertex player with a pure strategy is in steady state; for this rea-
son, initial conditions used for vertex players are equals to slightly perturbed
pure strategies (i.e. [0.99 0.01]T and [0.01 0.99]T are used in place of pure
strategies 1 and 2, respectively). Replicator equation on graphs has been
simulated until a steady state behavior is reached, starting from 4 different
distribution initial conditions on the graph.
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Figure 1: Graphs topologies. All edges have weights equal to 1, except for thicker ones
in the asymmetric weighted graph, having weights equal to 3.
The steady state situations are shown in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 6. The first
column of each Figure gives a picture of the initial conditions used, while
others report the solution of the simulations when steady state is reached for
each of the considered graphs. The color of each vertex indicates the value
of xv,1, and hence it visually quantifies the inclination of player v toward
one of the 2 feasible pure strategies; yellow is used for player with strategy
1 (xv,1 = 1), red is for strategy 2 (xv,1 = 0). Mixed strategies (0 < xv,1 < 1)
are indicated by shaded colors, according to the color bar at the bottom
of the Figures. Moreover, Figures 5 and 7 report the dynamical evolution
obtained on the asymmetric weighted graph; the same initial condition is
used in both Figures, while payoff matrices are different. The following
sections will discuss in detail the results of each simulation.
5.1 Two pure Nash equilibria
In this first experimental session, we used the following payoff matrix:
B =
[
1 0
0 θ
]
, (16)
with θ > 0.
The 2-players game described by B has 2 strict pure Nash equilibria (i.e.
both players use strategy 1 or 2) and a mixed Nash equilibrium
x∗ =
[
θ
1 + θ
1
1 + θ
]T
.
The classical replicator equation, based on matrix B, has exactly 3 rest
points which coincide with the Nash equilibria reported above. Moreover,
mixed equilibrium is repulsive, while pure equilibria are attractive; for this
reason, we say that B is a bistable payoff matrix.
Figure 2 reports some results obtained when θ = 1. Row (a) of the
Figure shows what happens when an homogeneous initial condition is used;
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Figure 2: Strategies distribution at t = 0 (first column) and at t = 50 (other columns)
on open, closed and asymmetric weighted star graphs, when the payoff matrix is reported
in equation (16) and θ = 1. 4 different initial conditions are considered: homogeneous (a),
external outlayer (b), central outlayer (c) and external-central outlayers (d).
as said in section 4.4, the dynamics is the same for each vertex player, and
it is equivalent to the solution given by the classical replicator equation,
whichever is the underlying graph structure. After a certain time, all vertex
players adopt pure strategy 1, since it represents an attractive rest point,
and initial condition is in inside the relative basin of attraction.
In the row (b) of Figure 2 are reported the steady state situations ob-
tained by using an homogeneous initial condition, where only one peripheral
player uses the quasi-pure strategy 2. At the end of simulation, the pure
strategy 1 spreads all over the considered graphs. Let’s consider the open
graph situation: the vertex player 1, which is the unique neighbors of player
2, has no will to change his own strategy, since he is surrounded by 4 yellow
players. Similarly, on the closed and asymmetric weighted star, neighbors
of player 2 see an equivalent player which is almost yellow. Thus, none of
them wants to change, and player 2 must modify his strategy. Hence player
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2 must change his strategy to obtain a good payoff. In a certain way, the
”rebel“ peripheral player decides to adapt himself to the majority.
The dynamical behavior is slightly different when the central hub is the
rebel. In the row (c) of the Figure 2 are shown the solutions of the replicator
equation on graphs for this initial condition. When the open star is used,
player 1 sees a yellow equivalent player, while all peripheral players have
only him as neighbor. Player 1 decides to change his own strategy to yel-
low, while all others do the exact opposite. After a certain time, they meet
half way, at the mixed equilibrium [0.5 0.5]T . The different position of the
rebel player in the graph influences a lot the dynamics of the whole system;
the leader (player 1) understands that he must modify his own strategy
according to his neighborhood, while all other players do the same, since
their only opponent is player 1 himself. However, closed and asymmetric
weighted graphs are more resistant to the influence of player 1, because the
peripheral players have more than one neighbors; in these situations, player
1 does not play anymore as a leader able to change the whole dynamics.
The last row (d) of Figure 2 reports the final solutions when both player
1 and 2 use the quasi-pure strategy 2. While the closed star structure re-
mains resistant to the influence of rebel players, the other graphs do not.
The open star becomes all red at final time. This is because player 2 sees
only player 1: they are both red, so player 2 doesn’t want to change strat-
egy. Simultaneously, yellow neighbors of 1 change their strategy to red, since
they see only a red player.
Changing the value of the parameter θ leads to different behaviors. When
θ < 1, first strategy becomes stronger and it spreads all over the considered
graphs as θ goes to 0. In Figure 3 are reported some results obtained with
θ = 1.1. In particular, when player 1 uses strategy 2 at the beginning,
then mixed equilibrium is not reached anymore on the open star graph;
all vertices adopt strategy 2, which is slightly better than strategy 1. The
strength of strategy 2 is also visible on the asymmetric weighted star, when
at the beginning both player 1 and 2 adopt strategy 2; in Figure 2 (θ = 1)
we have shown that on steady state, players 2 and 6 are the only ones red,
while when θ = 1.1, also players 1 and 5 do. In general, when θ > 1, strategy
2 becomes stronger and it spreads all over the considered graphs as θ grows
up.
5.2 Prisoners’ dilemma
In this section, we show the results obtained with the replicator equation
on graphs, by using a modified version of the prisoners’ dilemma game, as
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Figure 3: Strategies distribution at t = 0 (first column) and at t = 50 (other columns)
on open, closed and asymmetric weighted star graphs, when the payoff matrix is reported
in equation (16) and θ = 1.1. 2 different initial conditions are considered: central outlayer
(a) and external-central outlayers (b).
proposed in [2]. The payoff matrix is the following:
B =
[
1 0
θ 0
]
, (17)
where θ > 1.
Cooperate and Defect are the names typically used to indicate, respec-
tively, the strategy 1 and 2 of this classic game. The dilemma is that mutual
cooperation produces a better outcome than mutual defection; however, at
the individual level, the choice to cooperate is not rational from a selfish
point of view. In other words, the 2-players game has only one Nash equi-
librium, reached when both players defect. Note that in this version of the
prisoner’s dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is non strict. Moreover, classical
replicator equation based upon payoff matrix reported in equation (17), has
2 rest points, which correspond to the pure strategies (1, 1) and (2, 2). In
particular, the first one is repulsive, while the latter is attractive.
Although mutual defection represents both a Nash and a dynamical equi-
librium, many works have shown that cooperation does not vanishes when
games are played over graphs and θ is equal to suitable values (see [2,20–22]).
The resilience of cooperation is shown in 4, where θ is set to 1.5. Steady
states depend on the initial conditions and on the type of graph used, and
behaviors can be very heterogeneous. When an homogeneous initial condi-
tion is considered (row (a)), all players on graphs become defectors (again,
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Figure 4: Strategies distribution at t = 0 (first column) and at t = 100 (other columns)
on open, closed and asymmetric weighted star graphs, when the payoff matrix is reported
in equation (17) and θ = 1.5. 4 different initial conditions are considered: homogeneous
(a), external outlayer (b), central outlayer (c) and external-central outlayers (d).
this is the case when the classical and proposed replicator equations are the
same). On the other side, when initial conditions are not homogeneous (rows
(b), (c) and (d)), cooperation does not always completely vanish. Figure 5
shows the time course of the variable xv,1 for each vertex of the graph. In
particular, the initial conditions with external outlayer and the asymmetric
weighted graph have been used.
5.3 Unique mixed Nash equilibrium
In some 2-players games there are no pure Nash equilibria. Nevertheless,
Nash theorem guarantees that at least a mixed equilibrium exists. For ex-
ample, this happens when payoff matrix is defined as follows:
B =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (18)
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Figure 5: Prisoners’ dilemma game. Time courses of each vertex (top) and average
behavior over the network (bottom). Network topology, initial conditions and parameter
θ are the same used in Figure 4, row b, column 4.
The unique mixed Nash equilibrium is:
x∗ = [0.5 0.5]T .
Classical replicator equation has 3 rest points; symmetric couples of pure
strategies, (1, 1) and (2, 2) are repulsive, while the mixed equilibrium is at-
tractive. In this case, we speak about coexistence of both feasible strategies.
In Figure 6 the steady state solutions when payoff matrix defined in
equation (18) is used, are reported. Again, when we have an homogeneous
initial condition, everything works like a classical replicator equation, and
hence, all players go to the mixed Nash equilibrium. When initial condition
is not homogeneous, behaviors obtained through the replicator equation on
graphs are strongly based on the topological structure of the underlying
graph and on the initial conditions. Figure 7 shows in details the behavior
of the population when the asymmetric weighted graph and initial conditions
with external outlayer are supposed.
21
Figure 6: Strategies distribution at t = 0 (first column) and at t = 50 (other columns)
on open, closed and asymmetric weighted star graphs, when the payoff matrix is reported
in equation (18). 4 different initial conditions are considered: homogeneous (a), external
outlayer (b), central outlayer (c) and external-central outlayers (d).
6 Conclusions
In this work a new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs
with generic topology has been developed. We proposed a replicator equa-
tion on graphs,dealing with a finite population of players connected through
an arbitrary topology. A link between two players can be weighted by a pos-
itive real number to indicate the strength of the connection. Furthermore,
the different perception that each player has about the game is modeled by
allowing the presence of directed links and different payoff matrices for each
member of the population. A player obtains his outcome after 2-players
games are played with his neighbors; payoffs of each game are averaged
(WA model) or simply summed up (WS model). Moreover, it has been
shown that the proposed replicator equation on graphs extends the classical
one, under the hypotheses that WA model for payoffs is used, homogeneous
initial conditions over the vertices are considered, all vertex players have the
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Figure 7: Unique mixed Nash equilibrium game. Time courses of each vertex (top) and
average behavior over the network (bottom). Network topology and initial conditions are
the same used in Figure 6, row b, column 4.
same payoff matrix. In any case, no limitations are imposed to the under-
lying graph.
Experimental results showed that the dynamics of evolutionary games
are strongly influenced by the network topology. As expected, more com-
plex behavior emerges with respect to the classical replicator equation. For
example, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviors can coexist over the graph. Moreover, when a 2-player game
with strictly dominant strategies is considered, heterogeneous behavior is
obtained, i.e. a part of the population chooses to play a dominant strategy,
while others use different strategies. Then, players become mixed (coexis-
tence of strategies).
The very first step for extending this work is the study of dynamical
and evolutionary stability of the rest points. By the way, we imagine that
the concept of evolutionary stability must be revisited to deal with the pro-
posed evolutionary multi-players game model based on graph, for which a
theoretical effort is needed. Indeed, in our opinion, the basic question “is
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strategy s resistant to invasion?” must be reformulated to fit with the new
model, where the population of players is finite and is organized according
to a social structure.
The theory developed in this paper can also be extended to 3 or more
strategies and can consider more complex topologies of the graph, such as
small world, scale free, and random complex networks.
From an applicative point of view, the authors intend to use the replicator
equation on graphs to deal with biological and physical processes, such as
bacterial growth [26], model of brain dynamics [27] and reaction-diffusion
phenomena [28]. The developed model can be also profitably applied to
solve networked socio-economics problems, such as decision making for the
development of marketing strategies.
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